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I. INTRODUCTION

Bush v. Gore' presents us with something of a paradox. The U.S.
Supreme Court frustrated the political processes by which we ordinarily
choose our president by finding a constitutional violation that could not be
remedied, according to that Court, in a manner consistent with Florida
law.2 At the same time, the constitutional violation the Court identified
advanced the cause of voting rights. The U.S. Supreme Court found that
the Florida Supreme Court denied some voters, whose ballots were "legal"
under state law,3 the right to have their votes counted equally with other
votes.4 To overstate the point somewhat: the U.S. Supreme Court denied
the right of United States citizens to cast votes that were effective to
ensure that everyone who voted could cast an effective vote. In one way,
the Court's decision on the merits vindicated the right to vote. But in
another way, the Court's termination of the recount defeated the right to
vote.
This Article places Bush v. Gore in the context of the historical
development of the right to vote, and speculates about the decision's
doctrinal future by attempting to identify the underlying constitutional

* Carmack Waterhouse Professor ofConstitutional Law at Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. Mr.
Tushnet is the co-author of the most widely used casebook on constitutional law, Constitutional

Law (with Stone, Seidman, and Sunstein).

1. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
2. Id. at 107-10. The "ordinary" political process includes the methods for resolving
controversies over who actually won the presidential election prescribed in the Constitution and
federal statutes. See e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
3. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 (Fla. 2000).
4. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 107-08.
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violation of Florida's provisions more carefully than the U.S. Supreme
Court did.5
II. HISTORY OF THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Any enumeration of stages in the development of the right to vote is
arbitrary.6 For present purposes, we can begin with the establishment of a
right to vote per se, that is, the transformation of government from one
where power was exercised according to hereditary rights, to another
where power is derived ultimately from the people. The first step in
creating a right to vote was to have elections in which someone voted.
Nothing in such a system required that everyone be entitled to vote,
however.7 Conceptually, two grounds were available to justify limiting the
franchise. First, some might be thought to be properly subject to control
by others, either directly, as in slavery, or indirectly, as when the poor,
despite their inability to vote, are subject to punishment for violating
criminal laws enacted by elected legislatures. Second, those not entitled to
vote might be considered represented by others through virtual
representation.8
The Declaration of Independence challenged both grounds for denying
the right to vote.9 In asserting that "all men are created equal," the
Declaration undermined any account that sought to justify personal
subjection- despite the fact that the Declaration's authors knew that their
society was shot through with personal subjection, especially the
subjection of slaves to masters, and of women to men.'0 In addition, in
claiming a right to be self-governing, the Declaration rejected the
proposition that the colonists were virtually represented in Parliament."
Of course, independence alone did not create a comprehensive right to
vote. Generations of popular struggle went into vindicating a universal
right to vote, even though such a right may have been implicit in the

5. I do not fault the Court for incompletely defining the constitutional right, under the time
pressures it imposed on itself.
6. For a recent historical treatment of the development of the right to vote in the United

States, see ALEXANDER

KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY
IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).

7. Id. at xvi.
8. Virtual representation refers to the belief that legislators not elected by some group might
nonetheless take that group's interests into account when making policy.
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
10. Id. at para 2. For discussions of the implications of the Declaration's theory for systems
of personal subjection, see THOMAS G. WEST, VINDICATING THE FOUNDERS: RACE, SEX, CLASS,
AND JUSTICE IN THE ORIGINS OF AMERICA

(1997) and

ROBERT A. GOLDWIN, WHY BLACKS,

WOMEN, AND JEWS ARENOT MENTIONED INTHE CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER UNORTHODOX VIEWS
(1990).
11. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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theory underlying the Declaration of Independence. As historian
Alexander Keyssar states, "The conflict over the franchise that erupted
during the revolution involved - as such conflicts always would - both
interests and ideas."' 2 In this Article, an outline is provided of the popular
struggles and ideas that animated them without pretending to offer a full
account of those struggles and the political circumstances under which
they succeeded or failed. Keyssar's list of factors that affected political
outcomes suggests the scope that such an account must have: "grassroots
economic
pressure, ideological resonance, wartime mobilization,
'3
incentives, class interest, and partisan advantage."'
Through the nineteenth century, social movements sought to eliminate
systems of personal subjection that placed the poor, slaves, and women
under the control of others. Some ofthese movements focused on the right
to vote directly, while others saw the right to vote as only one part of a
comprehensive challenge to systems of personal subjection. The first
movement to succeed involved the right to vote only. During the
Jacksonian era, states abolished property qualifications for voting, creating
universal manhood suffrage - the word manhood indicating that women
were not yet thought entitled to vote, and the absence of the word white
indicating that suffrage for African-Americans was not yet even on the
agenda.' 4
The fight to abolish slavery initially took as its aim the institution of
slavery alone. Many abolitionists, especially those who sought to abolish
slavery because of its political effects on the national government, were
unsure that abolition meant more than ensuring that African-Americans
could own themselves, and thereby participate fully in the economy as
autonomous actors. Abolition was, initially, a struggle for civil rights, as
that term was understood in the 1850s and 1860s.'" Civil rights arose from
the fact that people lived in organized societies; there were basic human
rights to which every person was entitled simply on account of being
human that included the right to own property, enter into contracts, and6
testify in court so as to be able to defend in property and contract actions.'
Civil rights emphatically did not include the right to vote, which was
described as a political right, flowing not from the fact of humanity itself

12. KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 8 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 195.
14. Id. at 29, 101.
15. See Mark Tushnet, Political Aspects of the Changing Meaning of Equality in
ConstitutionalLaw: The EqualProtection Clause,Dr. Du Bois, and CharlesHamilton Houston,

74 J.Am. HIST. 884 (1987) (discussing the distinction between civil and political rights).
16. Id.
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but from the fact that people lived in particular societies each with its
distinctive form of political organization."7
Events demonstrated that securing civil rights was inadequate, for both
political and human reasons. The Thirteenth Amendment 8 abolished
slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment' 9 protected the civil rights of the
freed slaves (and everyone else). However, a high degree of personal
subjection remained in the South. Further, Republican proponents of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments understood that their political
power was vulnerable as long as African-Americans could not vote in the
South.20 The Fifteenth Amendment, 21 providing that the right to vote could
not be denied on the basis of race, was adopted to ensure that AfricanAmericans could protect themselves politically in the South, and that
Republicans
could do the same by giving them an assured base of political
22
power.
The Fifteenth Amendment guaranteed the right to vote in a formal
sense, but it proved inadequate in practice. By 1876, the nation's
commitment to racial equality had weakened; Republicans were willing to
sacrifice African-American interests in exchange for retaining the
presidency after the contested 1876 election. 23 The Fifteenth Amendment
remained on the books, but many African-Americans were deprived of the
effective right to vote by legal and extra-legal means.
These exclusionary practices took two forms: terror and law. Through
the early 1950s, African-Americans who sought to vote in the segregated
South were routinely killed or beaten until federal prosecutions and, more
important, public opinion began to limit what terrorists could do. Effective
disfranchisement of African-Americans through law could be challenged
as violation of the Fifteenth Amendment, and occasionally the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated statutes that it described as ingenious but
disingenuous attempts to single out African-Americans for
disfranchisement. Generally, however, the U.S. Supreme Court found

17. Id.

18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
20. KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 108.

21. U. S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
22. See LAWANDA COX & JOHN H. Cox, POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND PREJUDICE 1865-1866:
DILEMMA OF RECONSTRUCTION AMERICA (1963).
23. For the classic discussion, see C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION: THE
COMPROMISE OF 1877 AND THE END OF RECONSTRUCTION (1951).

24. See, e.g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating Oklahoma's
"grandfather clause," which exempted from existing voter qualification requirements those whose
ancestors had been qualified to vote before the Civil War); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939) ("The [Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination.").
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acceptable statutes that were neutral on their face in that the statutes did
not explicitly refer to race, even though it was well-known that such
statutes were implicitly aimed at disfranchising African-Americans.25 The
most celebrated example is the Court's 1959 decision upholding North
Carolina's literacy test, when such tests were known to be used in the
South to exclude African-Americans from the voting booths.26
With no response coming from the U.S. Supreme Court, reformers of
voting rights turned to Congress. The Voting Rights Act of 196527 barred
the use of literacy and other forms of voter qualification. More important,
the Act required states with particularly bad records of voting exclusions
to obtain the permission either of the Department of Justice or a federal
court for changes in voting qualifications and practices.28 With the
effective enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, African-Americans finally
secured their right to cast a vote.
The women's suffrage movement extended from before the Civil War
through 1920, when the Nineteenth Amendment 9 took effect. The
movement's founding document, the Seneca Falls Declaration (1848), was
modeled after the Declaration of Independence.3" The movement's leaders
believed that the expansion of the franchise to include African-Americans
would inevitably lead to a similar expansion to include women.3 They
were warned, however, that society could only take up "one question at
a time," and they objected to the implicit endorsement of excluding
women from the franchise in the Fourteenth Amendment's second section,
which provided that a state's representation in Congress could be reduced
if the state denied the right to vote "to any of the male inhabitants of such
State."32 Efforts to use the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for
women's suffrage failed in 1874, 33 and the women's suffrage movement
began a long effort to gain the franchise state-by-state. Yet, by 1900, only
four states provided for a general right to vote for women, all in the
West.34 The suffrage movement's successes accelerated after 1910, as ten
more states enfranchised women, some already anticipating the Nineteenth
Amendment's adoption."

25. KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 115-16.

26. Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)(c) (1965).
28. Id.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
30. The SENECA FALLS DECLARATION (1848), available at http://www.ukans.edu/carrie/

docs/texts/seneca.htm.
31. See KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 177-78.
32. Id. at 177; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2.
33. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
34. KEYSSAR, supra note 6, at 195.

35. Id. at 206.
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With some qualifications, suffrage was nearly universal by the 1980s,
in the sense that categorical exclusions from the franchise were rare and
largely uncontroversial. As Alexander Keyssar's recent work shows,
however, the story of suffrage is not one of unalloyed progress. 36 Even on
the formal level, there was "backsliding and sideslipping." 7 Expansion of
the categories of people eligible to vote was accompanied by, and often
provoked, franchise restrictions through the development of administrative
mechanisms. For example, voter registration schemes and residency
requirements limited the number of people from the newly enfranchised
categories who would actually vote.38 Some of these restrictive devices,
such as the poll tax and literacy tests, were designed precisely to restrict
the franchise.3 9 Others, like the secret ballot, had some restrictive effects
by making it more difficult for political parties to mobilize their
supporters.40 Categorical exclusions from the franchise remain today, the
most prominent being the exclusion in many states of persons convicted
of felonies who have fully discharged their criminal sentences. 4' Some of
these exclusions were designed to disfranchise African-Americans.42
These residual categorical exclusions aside, the expansion of voting
rights continued with a change in focus. The transformation of the United
States from a rural nation to an urban one meant that traditional
apportionment of seats in legislatures resulted in urban voters having less
political power than their numbers suggested, at least according to one
theory of democracy. Discontent with malapportionment reached the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1946, when the Court rejected a challenge to Illinois's
apportionment system in Colegrove v. Green.43 A divided U.S. Supreme
Court found the case unsuitable for decision for a variety of reasons.
Justice Felix Frankfurter pithily urged the Court to stay out of what he
called the "political thicket" of apportionment.44 Frankfurter was
concerned that controversies over apportionment were intensely partisan,
and thought that the Court would be damaged if it intervened in such

36. Id. at 53-76.
37. Id. at 53 (chapter title).
38. See, e.g., id. at 28 (describing early administrative mechanisms), 127-29 (describing
similar efforts between 1865 and 1920).
39. See id. at 111-12 (describing the initiation of such requirements in the late nineteenth
century South).
40. Id. at 142-43 (describing the effects of the Australian, or secret, ballot).
41. For a critical overview, see George P. Fletcher, Disenfranchisement as Punishment:
Reflections on the Racial Uses of Infamia, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1895 (1999).
42. See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (invalidating an Alabama felondisfranchisement provision because it was intended to disfranchise African-Americans).
43. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
44. Id. at 556 (Frankfurter, J.,
joined by Reed and Burton, J.J.).
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controversies.45 The Court eventually rejected Frankfurter's counsel in the
1960S,46 and discovered that Frankfurter's political judgment was

mistaken. The Warren Court's "one person, one vote" decisions, though
initially upsetting to political office-holders, were among that Court's most
popular.47
The theory underlying the Court's reapportionment decisions was more
troublesome than the public might have initially realized. Chief Justice
Earl Warren memorably wrote, "Legislators represent people, not trees or
acres."48 That described one, but not all, theories of democracy. Perhaps
more important, malapportionment injured urban voters by diluting their
votes. Voters were admitted to the voting booth, but when their votes were
counted, each vote cast in a city had less political impact than a vote cast
in a rural area.
When transferred to the context of race, vote dilution became
controversial. The elimination of formal barriers to voting meant that
everyone had the effective right to cast a ballot. The theory of vote dilution
was that people who exercised that right should also have the right to a
fully or equally effective vote. Yet, the effectiveness of a person's vote
could be reduced not simply by giving it less weight than another person's,
as with malapportionment. A voter's effectiveness could be reduced by
making it more difficult for a person to vote for a winning candidate.49
In 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court held that this sort of vote dilution did
not violate the Constitution unless the purpose of the statute that allowed
the dilution was to reduce the effectiveness of votes cast by AfricanAmericans. 50 However, Congress found this vote dilution sufficiently
troubling to justify a legislative response. The Voting Rights Act of 1982"1
outlawed practices that restricted the ability of African-Americans to elect
the representative they preferred.52 Coupled with the "pre-clearance"
requirements of the 1965 Voting Rights Act," these provisions led to a

45. Id.
46. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (finding apportionment challenges to be
justiciable); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (adopting the "one person, one vote" standard).
47. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 255 (2000).
48. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 562.
49. For a recent discussion of the development of the vote dilution doctrine and the
controversies associated with that doctrine, see Heather K. Gerken, Understandingthe Right to an
Undiluted Vote, 114 HARV. L. REv. 1663 (2001).
50. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-66 (1980).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982).
52. I believe that City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997), and Bd.of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett,531 U.S. 356 (2001), cast serious doubt on the present constitutionality of this
aspect of the Voting Rights Act of 1982.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1965).
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series of controversial cases involving what critics characterized as racial
gerrymandering in the aftermath of the 1990 Census.54
III. THE FUTURE OF BUSH V. GORE
What light does this history cast on Bush v. Gore?" One common
version is that the case represents a new stage in voting rights litigation:
from concern over categorical exclusions, to concern over the
effectiveness of votes cast by people with the right to vote, to concern over
the mechanics of voting.56 While not inaccurate, this description does not
make the equal protection doctrine the Court articulated central to our
understanding of the case.
When the Court's doctrine is taken seriously, Bush v. Gore is another
case involving extension of the franchise in the context of vote dilution."
On first impression, the problem in Bush v. Gore is simple: some people
walked into the voting booth and cast their votes, but after they left the
booth the vote counters decided not to count their votes. Classic examples
of voting fraud seem to take a similar form, as when boxes containing
votes from one or more precincts are simply thrown into the river.5"
However, the first impression, and the analogy to classic vote fraud, is
misleading. The Court's equal protection analysis is necessarily
comparative and, as will be argued, its doctrine does not make anything
turn on an intent to deny any identifiable group its vote.
The problem in Bush v. Gore was that some votes were counted and
others were not. In contrast, in the vote fraud example the injury may be
noncomparative; some had the appearance of a right to vote but not the
54. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U. S. 234 (2001); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995);
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
55. In what follows, I assume that the decision does create a binding precedent available for
future use. No court can confine the implications of a decision in the manner the Court suggested
when it wrote, "Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances," and defined the
constitutional problem as one arising "in the special instance of a statewide recount under the
authority of a single state judicial officer." 531 U.S. at 109.
56. See, e.g., SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., WHEN ELECTIONS Go BAD: THE LAW OF
DEMOCRACY AND THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 2000, at ii (2001) (distinguishing between

concern for "institutional arrangements" such as "structures of the political process, conceptions
of representation, [and the like]," and concern for "the nuts-and-bolts of casting votes and having
them counted"); Richard L. Hasen, Bush v. Gore and the Future of Equal Protection Law in
Elections, LOY. PUB. L. & LEGAL THEORY (2001), available at http://papers.

ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid-262030 (distinguishing between "big picture" and "nuts-and-bolts"
issues, and identifying three "levels of equality" involving universal suffrage, "the right to an
equally weighted vote," and "equality in the procedures and mechanisms used for voting").
57. So far the best analysis of which I am aware is Pamela S. Karlan, The Newest Equal
Protection: Regressive Doctrine on a Changeable Court, in THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE
SUPREME COURT

4 (Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001).

58. See ROBERT A. CARO, MEANS

OF

ASCENT 308-13, 318-21 (1990).
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right itself. Perhaps more important, the injury is ordinarily intentionally
inflicted on a group because of the concern of vote counters over who the
group voted for.
In Bush v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Florida law required
that authorities count all votes, either in a first pass or in a later recount. 9
Suppose that two hundred legal votes were in fact cast in one precinct. The
first pass through the machines captured 150 of those votes. A recount
under the procedures authorized by the Florida Supreme Court would
capture another twenty-five. A recount under different procedures would
capture the remaining twenty-five votes as well. The procedures adopted
by the Florida Supreme Court, then, harmed the twenty-five voters who
cast legal votes but whose votes would not be captured in the recount.'
One could treat this harm in several ways. Seeing the case as presenting
an ordinary vote-dilution scenario, one would ask whose votes were
diluted? One obvious answer is that the Florida Supreme Court's
procedures would dilute the votes for Governor Bush because these
procedures were "gerrymandered." That is, on this view the Florida
Supreme Court devised a recount system that gave a systematic advantage
to Vice President Gore by making it likely that more votes would be added
to the preliminary count from counties where Vice President Gore
appeared to have an advantage than would be added from counties
apparently favorable to Governor Bush. This advantage might violate
equal protection, akin to stuffing ballot boxes or throwing boxes of ballots
away. However, it is unclear that this claim could be sustained because of
the uncertainty about the extent to which the uncounted votes would be
distributed in the same proportion as were the votes initially counted. 6'
Alternatively, the Florida Supreme Court may have intended to favor Vice
President Gore even if the procedures it adopted were not well designed
to do so. This intention also might have violated equal protection, although
usually when intent is a component of equal protection analysis, one asks
that there be actual harm as well as an intent to harm.
It is important to emphasize that these two lines of analysis, while
arguably consistent with the facts underlying the U.S. Supreme Court's
decision, were not ones that the Court pursued. The Court was primarily
concerned that some votes, while "legal" under Florida law, would not be

59. 531 U.S. at 104-05.
60. This analysis follows from the Court's concern that the procedure authorized by the
Florida Supreme Court included vote totals based on a complete recount of part of Miami-Dade
County's ballots, including both undervotes and overvotes, while the statewide recount the court
ordered would have included only the undervotes.
61. The very fact that a person cast a ballot that was an undervote or an overvote indicates
that that voter was different in some way from voters who cast ballots that were initially counted.
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counted under procedures authorized by the Florida Supreme Court.62 The

harm was that the state counted some but not all legal votes, not that some
group identified by a partisan - or any other - characteristic cast the
uncounted legal votes.63 Accordingly, the harm the Court recognized was
what Professor Pamela Karlan calls "structural."" That is, affecting the
structure of government without adversely affecting any individual.

The flaw in the Florida Supreme Court's decision was that it allowed
the final vote total to include some, but not all, of the "legal votes," while
there were other procedures available to include all votes in the final total.

But, of course, no procedure can ever guarantee that all legal votes will be

included in the final total.65 The question then becomes, what can justify

a refusal to include a legal vote in the final total?
According to standard equal protection doctrine, one assesses purported
justifications by invoking either rational-basis review or strict scrutiny.6 6
The U.S. Supreme Court waffled on the standard it applied. In one

paragraph, it characterized the right to vote as "fundamental," which
would imply that only the strongest justifications could be provided for
disparate treatment.67 Yet, in the next paragraph, the Court suggested that
Florida's procedures were "arbitrary," a term associated with rational-basis
review.6" The Court's decision can be rationalized only if the standard
requires that a state must have a reasoned basis, other than local control,
for the procedures it uses to identify legal votes.
Professor Hasen has outlined one part of the argument. 69 Recall the
hypothetical precinct in which 150 legal votes were counted initially, 25
were added in a recount, and 25 went uncounted. Suppose that, instead of

ordering a recount, the state simply stood on the initial count. Now fifty
voters who cast legal votes would suffer the structural harm, rather than

62. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 107-08.
63. Decisions like Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (involving a racial
gerrymander), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (involving the dilution of voters in urban
and suburban areas), involve discrimination against groups with identifiable characteristics, in a
way that Bush v. Gore as decided by the U.S. Supreme Court does not.
64. Karlan, supra note 57. This characterization links Bush v. Gore
to the history recounted
earlier, for each prior expansion of the franchise altered the structure of governance as well.
65. Strictly speaking, we could define a legal vote as one that is identified as legal according
to lawful procedures. Bush v. Gore appears to preclude that definition by overriding the Florida
Supreme Court's determination of what procedures are legally sufficient to identify legal votes.
66. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 528-29 (1997).
67. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 104 ("When the state legislature vests the right to vote for
President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one
source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity
owed to each voter.").
68. Id. at 104-05 ("Having once granted the right to vote on equal terms, the State may not,
by later arbitrary and disparate treatment, value one person's vote over that of another.").
69. Hasen, supra note 56.
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only twenty-five. Could that harm be justified? According to the U.S.
Supreme Court, yes. After all, that is precisely what the Court said Florida
law required when a recount pursuant to constitutionally permissible
standards could not be completed before December 12, 2000. According
to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Florida legislature chose this deadline to
ensure that its electoral votes would be conclusively valid.7" Would the
legislature's justification survive strict scrutiny? Professor Hasen argues
persuasively that it would not. The Florida legislature would trade a
violation of the fundamental right to vote for the chance that the electors
would be rejected at the final stage of the selection process because they
were not conclusively deemed validly chosen.7' That trade-off would be
insufficient under strict scrutiny because Florida still had a decent chance
not a certainty, to be sure - that its choice would be respected in the
final stages anyway. It follows, if Professor Hasen is right, that the U.S.
Supreme Court could not have applied strict scrutiny.
Rather, the Court must have applied a rational-basis review. However,
the Court's review ruled out one important justification for the procedures
authorized by the Florida Supreme Court: local control. The U.S. Supreme
Court considered the lower court's procedures problematic because they
granted too much power to local control, rather than to a single decisionmaker that was in a better position to provide more guidance.72 The Court
stated that it was not to consider "whether local entities, in the exercise of
their expertise, may develop different systems for implementing
elections."73 It also stated that the instant case involved "a situation where
a state court with the power to assure uniformity" has authorized a
procedure that provided no assurance "that the rudimentary requirements
of equal treatment and fundamental fairness are satisfied."'74 This does
describe the situation; the question is whether there are any principled
limitations implicit in that description.
There are two important components of the Court's description of
Florida's situation: first, that there is a decision-maker with power to
assure uniformity, and second, that this decision-maker is a court. One can
understand why the first element is important: it guarantees that, as a
matter of state law, there is a decision-maker who can set up a system that
provides equal treatment. But, there is no principled reason for limiting
that decision-maker to the courts. Specifically, a state legislature with the
power under state law to adopt a uniform system of vote counting and
recounting would seem required to do so by the Court's doctrine.

70. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 110.
71. Hasen, supra note 56.
72. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 109.

73. Id.
74. Id.
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Therefore, the Court's equal protection rule appears to be that a state
may adopt any reasonable system for identifying legal votes, but may not
justify a system that allows variations within the state by adverting to the
interest of local control."' Bush v. Gore, then, appears to place some
constraints on legislative decisions. The state legislature need not adopt a
system that guarantees that officials will count every legal vote, but it
cannot adopt procedures that allow officials to count legal votes in one
county while officials fail to count equivalent legal votes in another.
More particularly, the U.S. Supreme Court found the abstract standard
of clear intent of the voter76 generally acceptable.77 It seems to follow that
state legislatures cannot adopt a system that identifies a voter's intent to
vote for a candidate in County A, but fails to identify another voter's clear
intent in County B when the sole justification is to preserve local control.
This analysis has already generated challenges in several states with
systems authorizing different methods of counting votes initially. 7
But, as Professors Karlan and Hasen suggest, 79 structural claims can
reach well beyond the context of electoral machinery. Here one can return
to the history of the right to vote to inquire about the conditions under
which expansive structural claims might have some purchase in the law.
The U.S. Supreme Court played quite a secondary role in prior expansions
of the franchise. Rather, mobilized social groups, such as the abolitionists,
emancipated slaves, and the women's suffrage movements, played a more
significant role in expanding voting rights. Sometimes, though not
consistently, U.S. Supreme Court decisions assisted those groups in their
larger social and political struggles.80
IV. CONCLUSION

In light of this history, Bush v. Gore presents an interesting picture. The
post-Reagan Republican party and its supporters might well be an example
of a mobilized social group analogous to those that pushed expansions of
the franchise in the past. Yet, nothing in the Republican political program
75. The obvious justification that remains available is cost, although most of the costs that
have been referred to in post-Bush v. Gore discussions have been the costs associated with the

transition from a system with local variations to a uniform statewide system, rather than the
absolute cost of one rather than another system of counting legal votes.
76. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1256 (Fla. 2000) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 101.5614 (5)-

(6)(2000)).
77. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. at 105-06.
78. 1think it worth emphasizing that, given the nature of the structural harm that underlies
Bush v. Gore, these claims seem to have merit independent of whether variations among
jurisdictions correlate with anything else, such as wealth, racial composition of the jurisdictions,
or the expected political preferences of the jurisdictions.
79. Hasen, supra note 56; Karlan, supra note 57.
80. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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seems to have much to do with expansion of the franchise. In contrast, the
Democratic party managed to mobilize its supporters, particularly AfricanAmericans and some ofthe elderly, during the post-election events." Bush
v. Gore may prove to have larger implications than the five conservative
justices who joined it might wish, but only if a social and political
movement sustains pressure for revision of our election laws.

81. Despite the fact that the candidate they were supporting had not been a vigorous advocate
of those groups' distinctive political agendas.

